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Any good follower of the news or current affairs knows that al-Shabab has been causing 
trepidation for the Somalis for some 
time. The group is good at inter 
alia suicide bombings. The story of 
al-Shabab is not an analogy of Mary 
Shelley’s gothic story "Frankenstein" 
as is the US al-Qaeda case, but it is 
not entirely unrelated. When did the 
al-Shabab phenomenon begin and 
how did it get to where it is now?
Metaphysical theory strongly urges 
seeking an understanding of not only 
how something came to the way it 
happens to be but also considering 
the many strands of its constituents. 
To understand al-Shabab’s ideological 
orientation and operations, one really 
needs to put it within a socio-political 
context. Abdullahi Boru Halakhe paints 
a picture of al-Shabab’s worldview 
vis-à-vis their socio-cultural and 
political background, which is often 
over simplified by many analysts.
In understanding Somalis, one 
has to struggle with the paradox of 
being at once pastoral democrats 
– ready to negotiate some issues 
– and an unflinching republican, 
some relations like family are non-
negotiable. Al-Shabab concentrated 
on the latter part. While Somalis can 
trenchantly disagree over their clan 
politics, however, when it comes 
to their sovereignty, both personal 
and collectively, they will never 
negotiate. They are unrepentant 
nationalists, and in the absence of a 
state, rhetorically and symbolically, 
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om al-Shabab acts as the vanguard and 
the only reliable guardian of Somali 
nationalism and identity.1
With a diligent hindsight, Halakhe 
scrupulously articulated the organic 
base of al-Shabab. A Chatham House 
briefing paper entitled 'The Rise and 
Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts' 
highlighted that the Shababs “were 
not men with a religious background, 
but they were the driving force behind 
the implementation of [tribal] court 
jurisdictions.”2 Peter Greste, reporting 
for Al-Jazeera, stated that “Somalis 
themselves are not instinctively radical 
but they hold tightly to their tradition”.3 
The story of al-Shabab began in the 
mid 2000s when ordinary youth reacted 
to waves of unexplained assassinations 
and disappearances in Mogadishu. 
Those operations were carried out by 
a group of warlords conniving with the 
CIA, working under the banner ‘The 
Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and 
Counter-Terrorism’ (ARPCT). It was later 
discovered that the assassinations and 
disappearances were part of a covert 
anti-terror US government operation. 
The ARPCT targeted prominent 
religious leaders known to have no link 
with any terror organisation as well as 
individuals and independent clan courts 
antagonistic to the warlords. The then 
U.S. State Department spokesman Sean 
McCormack praised their iniquities 
and described them as “responsible 
individuals”.4
In response, a loose group of 
moderate youth volunteered to fight 
back and it is in this context that 
al-Shabab was born. They regarded it 
as their communal, tribal and national 
duty to react to foreign interference 
and the menaces of dodgy warlords 
committing heinous crimes against 
innocent people. 
Al-Shabab cast itself as the vanguard 
of the aggravated innocent Somalis in 
the fight against the insecurity caused 
by American-backed criminals. The 
CIA’s collaboration with internationally 
known warlords was part of US privy 
to criminality in Somalia. When the 
‘anti-terror’ campaign intensified, a 
loose formation of tribal courts (which 
became Union of Islamic Courts, UIC) 
joined forces with civil and religious 
organisations and, in a popular 
uprising, purged the warlords. 
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Nothing was politically sinister about 
the parties involved in the uprising. The 
renowned Somali Professor Abdi Ismail 
Samatar described the forces behind 
the uprising as “Islamic practitioners, 
rather than Islamists. Islamists has the 
connotation that they are incredibly 
politicised.”5 Nevertheless, speculation 
from sensationalist international 
media, hawkish intelligentsia and 
certain members of the international 
community linked the UIC to terrorism. 
Responding to those concerns, 
the chairman of UIC, Sharif Sheikh 
Ahmed, stated, “We categorically 
deny and reject any accusation that 
we are harbouring any terrorists or 
supporters of terrorism. We would like 
to establish a friendly relationship with 
the international community.”6 
In an effort to quell suspicions, 
Sharif began to build relations with 
the international community in spite 
of all indications showing that the 
US was unhappy with the changes 
in Mogadishu. In fact, the changes 
worried the US so much that George 
W Bush expressed determination to 
make sure “that Somalia does not 
become an al-Qaida safe haven, that 
it doesn’t become a place from which 
terrorists can plot and plan.”7 Evidence 
from Wikileaks shows that the US 
preferred Somalia to remain anarchic 
than to have peace and a government 
brought by Islamic groups, irrespective 
of their public standing.8
Aware of US dissatisfaction, the 
UIC proceeded to form a government, 
re-establish peace and security, and 
for the first time in 16 years, opened 
Mogadishu International Airport. 
Al-Shabab was integrated into the UIC, 
serving as its military wing, until the 
Ethiopian forces, backed by the US who 
did not want an Islamist government, 
invaded, shattering six months of 
stability brought to the lawless country. 
For the ordinary people who yearned 
for tranquility, the 2006 US-backed 
Ethiopian disruption brought woe and 
horror. It returned them to another cycle 
of vicious conflict and a catastrophic 
humanitarian crisis. The invasion killed 
20,000 civilians and rendered 2 million 
others homeless.9 During the two years 
of the Ethiopian occupation, Mogadishu 
became a ghost city experiencing an 
unprecedented level of destruction, far 
greater that it had seen during the entire 
period of its lawlessness. 
The defeat of the UIC led to 
a complete split of the nascent 
establishment. Al-Shabab regrouped 
and successfully fought the Ethiopian 
forces. Following the withdrawal of the 
Ethiopian troops, seeing the security 
vacuum in Mogadishu, al-Shabab 
consolidated their power. Upon 
realising that al-Shabab was in control 
of large swathes of the country, the 
US made allegations claiming that 
al-Shabab had established links with 
al-Qaeda and that members of its 
leadership had trained in Afghanistan.
With no credible evidence, the US 
killed Adan Hashi Ayrow, the leader of 
the group, along with more than two 
dozen civilians. The murders outraged 
the people and sparked large protests 
across central Somalia. Through its 
spokesman Mukhtar Robow (known as 
Abu Mansur), al-Shabab condemned 
the attack and warned against the 
possible consequences of such an 
action.   
This attack was cowardly and 
aggressive. We condemn the 
international Arab and Islamic 
community’s silence. These bombs 
are making Somalis more united. 
These people do not need bombs. 
They need international humanitarian 
help. It is good for America to stop. If 
America continues what it is doing, 
they will reap the harvest of the crop 
they have sown.10
According to a 2008 WikiLeaks 
Cable, Ayrow was killed because the 
Americans thought he was “violently 
opposed to U.S. and western 
interests”.11 No evidence linking Ayrow 
to al-Qaeda or any terror attacks on 
Western establishments has been 
produced to date. The truth is that 
neither Ayrow nor al-Shabab was at 
the time affiliated to al-Qaeda; much 
less did they present any threat to the 
West as was made evident in a speech 
made in the British Parliament during a 
debate discussing the “Prevention and 
Suppression of Terrorism”. A Labour 
MP, Dari Taylor, said
If there is no evidence that this 
organisation, al-Shabab, exists or is 
behaving in a way that is causing 
serious concern, some in our 
community – with some justice – will 
be concerned that the Government 
[is] exaggerating the existence of 
terrorist threats in this country.12
Ayrow’s death began to transform 
al-Shabab internally and externally. 
The group unleashed a powerful media 
campaign opening news sites and radio 
stations providing an alternative media. 
However, the group later became 
known internationally for its feeds 
through the social media: Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube. Al-Shabab used 
the media to justify its actions and 
provided updates on its progress.  
Apart from the media fraternity, 
al-Shabab reformed its structure and 
organisation so that it was able to focus 
on its military acumen while at the same 
time managing civilians living in areas 
under its control. The dexterity to use 
unparalleled brute force while purveying 
equal proportion of benignity portrayed 
bizarre combinations of qualities that 
could perfectly be explained by state 
formation theory. Al-Shabab brought 
a sudden halt to insecurity and filled 
in the void of municipal government: 
providing services like collecting 
garbage and inspecting pharmaceutical 
stores for expired drugs.13 The 
group banned Western Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
sparking international condemnation 
but replaced these with building 
multimillion-dollar canals in Somalia’s 
breadbasket in a bid to abolish 
dependence on food aid.14 Unlike the 
Taliban and Boko Haram, al-Shabab did 
not ban girls from going to school and 
women from working.  That, however, 
did not get due consideration. Neither 
was the group given a fair chance to 
negotiate or run a government nor find 
a solution that could bring a win-win 
situation. The US saw any fair chance 
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which could potentially result in any 
success for an Islamist group as the 
“worst-case scenario” and “the US 
would not allow it”.15 It did not want 
al-Shabab to play any constructive role 
in the formation of a future Somali 
government. 
In a bid to promote the  US agenda, 
the Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
Jandayi Fazer, took a set of steps driving 
the Transition Federal Government 
(TFG) and al-Shabab further apart. 
First, the US State Department 
waged an intensive media campaign 
stigmatising al-Shabab. For a while, the 
media demonised the group associating 
it with “terror”, “ruthlessness”, “threat” 
and “savagery”. Secondly, true to the 
proverb, give a dog a bad name and 
kill it; the State Department included 
the group in its terror list just months 
before the Ethiopian forces pulled out. 
This was a calculated pre-emptive 
move intended to kill the chances for 
any negotiation between the group 
and the TFG. Thirdly, the US put 
bounties on the heads of the al-Shabab 
leadership. 
The endeavour to ostracise and 
purge the group from the conventional 
political sphere of Somalia remained 
subtle until in 2012 the US Secretary 
of State, Hillary Clinton ordered the 
TFG not to negotiate with al-Shabab. 
She said, “Negotiating with al Shabab 
would be the wrong path, but the 
United States will engage with 
Somalis who denounce al Shabab's 
leadership.”16
Following the US directive, the 
TFG labeled al-Shabab a terrorist 
organisation. This was in contrast 
to the view held by many Somalis. 
The government openly opted for 
war over peace, and annihilation 
over negotiation. Instead of seeking 
a peaceful solution concentrating 
on, among other things, Xeer (the 
Somali traditional way of dealing with 
intractable problems), the government 
sought a military solution because it was 
vulnerable to attacks from al-Shabab 
and susceptible to pressure from 
powerful external actors. It requested 
funds and an African Union Mission to 
fight al-Shabab. The US, the EU and 
the AU pledged generous amounts 
of $40 million, 15 million euros and 
$11.6 million respectively.17 Several 
African countries pledged deployment 
as part of a peacekeeping mission.  
The people in Mogadishu held 
mass demonstrations protesting against 
the proposed peacekeeping mission 
burning flags and chanting anti-US 
and anti-AU slogans, but the protests 
fell on deaf ears. The political result 
of the American manoeuvres – linking 
al-Shabab to terrorism, proposing 
deployment of foreign troops to bring 
peace, and closing the doors for 
negotiations in favour of US support 
– were predictable. The generally 
more moderate members of al-Shabab 
became far more militant and radical. 
Al-Shabab made a statement: “We 
were not terrorists. But now that we 
have been designated, we have been 
forced to seek out and unite with any 
Muslims on the list [of terrorist groups] 
against the United States.”18
Al-Shabab waged a media campaign 
seeking support for its course. First, 
the group made an international plea 
asking for anyone willing to defend 
the Muslim land and religion against 
foreign aggression to come and join its 
ranks. The call was answered by none 
other than young Somalis in the West, 
mainly the US and the UK. It is here that 
al-Shabab got more media savvy English 
speaking Somali youngsters ready to die 
for their country and religion. Al-Jazeera 
featured a 45 minute long documentary 
entitled From Minneapolis to Mogadishu 
telling the story of more than 20 young 
Somali American men who went to fight 
in Somalia for al-Shabab.19 The group 
also began to issue a near daily warning 
to countries willing to send troops to 
Somalia advising them to avoid risking 
the lives of their soldiers and that of their 
civilians.  
Secondly, Al-Shabab intensified 
attempts to discredit the government 
and its leadership. The group released 
an audio recording entitled Sharif 
Muslim Sharif Murtad (Sharif the 
Muslim, Sharif the Apostate) making a 
dichotomous critique of Sharif’s theo-
political persuasions.20 The CD became 
widely circulated among the Somalis 
and was later uploaded onto YouTube. 
The message was that Sharif, who was 
formerly the group’s commander-in-
chief and later became the president of 
the TFG, had chamaeleonic behaviour 
and was unreliable and a dangerous 
political opportunist. Al-Shabab also 
accused the government of bringing 
enemy forces into the country. The 
group went further, and declared the 
government and its entire employees 
“apostates” notwithstanding its 
religious implication. Al-Shabab issued 
a stern warning to all who worked for, 
collaborated with, or were suspected of 
having any links with the government or 
the African Union Mission (AMISOM). 
Regarding the US government’s call 
not to negotiate with al-Shabab, the 
group hit back shutting all the doors for 
any possible negotiation with the TFG 
and later the Federal Government. 
Al-Shabab was convinced that nothing 
good would come of negotiating with 
a government that was a “puppet” of 
enemy states – the US and Ethiopia. 
It also despised the UN and IGAD for 
endorsing the Ethiopian invasion. A 
council of neutral Ulema attempted to 
mediate but to no avail.  
Al-Shabab took the above retaliatory 
steps fully aware of the fact that it had 
limited options left. Surrender was not 
an option. The group was militarily, 
financially and organisationally stronger 
than the government. It controlled 
most of South-Central Somalia and 
had an estimated force of more than 
7000 compared to the 4000 African 
Union peacekeeping mission keeping 
the government – holed in an enclave 
in Mogadishu – in place.21 In reality, 
the government was no match for 
al-Shabab, which was indisputably 
an alternative government given its 
territorial control and firepower. 
The government’s sole competitive 
advantage was recognition from the 
Evidence from 
Wikileaks shows that 
the US preferred 
Somalia to remain 
anarchic than to 
have peace and a 
government brought 
by Islamic groups, 
irrespective of their 
public standing.
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international community. 
Consistent with its views, “we have 
been forced to seek out and unite with 
any Muslims on the list against the 
United States”, Ahmed Abdi Godane 
(also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubayr), 
a poet and an erudite leader of the 
group, sent an application to Osama 
Bin Laden to join al-Qaeda as evident 
in two of the “17 Osama Bin Laden 
documents” posted onto the website 
of the National Journal. A letter dated 
7 August 2010 from Osama bin Laden 
responding to one from Mukhtar Abu 
Zubayr in which Abu Zubayr requested 
merger with the international network 
attests that al-Shabab meant what it 
said.22 Bin Laden’s secret letter politely 
declining the request inadvertently 
falsifies US claims against al-Shabab. 
Al-Shabab joined al-Qaeda in 2012 – a 
year after Bin Laden died.
Dr Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the successor 
of Bin Laden, made the announcement; 
“I have glad tidings for the Muslim 
ummah (nation), which is the joining of 
the al-Shabab al-Mujahidin Movement 
in Somalia to Qaedat al-Jihad to 
support the jihadi unity against … the 
treacherous agent rulers”.23 Al-Shabab 
became an affiliate of al-Qaeda. Since 
its affiliation, al-Shabab executed 
high profile suicide bombs targeting 
prominent individuals like MPs, the 
UN compound, the Presidential Palace 
(Villa Somalia), the National Theatre 
and AMISOM, all in Somalia. 
They also executed a chain of 
suicide bombings in Kenya including 
the Westgate Mall. Prior to joining 
al-Qaeda, operations carried out by 
the group were retaliatory and targeted 
the nations that deployed forces to 
Somalia. Kenya and Uganda were two 
such countries.   
Notwithstanding its genesis, 
al-Shabab’s suicide bombing in general 
and its indiscriminate targeting of 
crowded areas in particular where 
innocent civilians fall victims cannot 
be justified. Whether the group’s 
belligerence is a synthesis of patriotism 
and a skewed interpretation of Sharia, 
extreme puritanism, a reactionary 
ideology, is unimportant. Such acts are 
neither premised on the Somali ethos 
nor supported by the Islamic Sharia 
that clearly distinguishes enemies 
from innocents. The use of extreme 
measures as a means to an end is, 
therefore, intolerable. That said, 
al-Shabab is a reality and, therefore, 
has to be treated as one.
The USA’s position towards 
al-Shabab articulated by the former 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, 
rejecting any negotiation with the 
group has no place in the pacification 
and reconstruction of Somalia either. 
Such a perception is utterly flawed, 
and is indeed as pernicious as the 
Bush administration’s backing of the 
Ethiopian invasion. The earlier it is 
rectified, the better. In a 2012 issue, 
the National Intelligence Council 
(NIC) presented a Global Trend 
report predicting that Somalia will be 
among the top three failed states in 
the world by 2030 for reasons related 
to, among others, civil strife.24 Usage 
of conciliatory tones and neutral 
discourses instead of inflammatory 
terms is imperative to de-escalate 
the conflict. The Federal government 
needs to devise genuine mechanisms 
and find a negotiated solution – taking 
into account the interests of all sides – 
in the interest of Somalia, the region 
and the continent. ■
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